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Comment
The Case Against Cash-Outs in National Bank
Mergers: A Critical Analysis of NoDak
Bancorporation v. Clarke
Lori J. Carlson
A battle over the fate of the largest bank in a rural North
Dakota community' recently ended in defeat for the bank's mi-
nority shareholders. The majority shareholder of the closely-
held2 Liberty National Bank voted to eliminate the minority
shareholders 3 through a "cash-out" merger transaction.4 The
1. Liberty National Bank & Trust reported the largest net income of all
banks located in Dickinson, North Dakota, for the first quarter of 1994. LACE
FINANcLAL CORP., QUARTERLY BANK AND SAVINGS & LOAN RATING SERVICE 160
(Mar. 1994). Liberty National Bank's reported net income for that period was
$340 million, exceeding the next largest bank by $40 million. Id.
2. Closely-held entities are variously defined as enterprises with only a
few shareholders, enterprises with no active market for their shares, and enter-
prises where all shareholders are active in the management and conduct of the
business. I F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAi's CLOSE CoRPo-
RATIONS § 1.02, at 4-5 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ONEA3'S CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS]. State statutes often define closely-held corporations as those having no
more than 35 shareholders. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-01(6) (1993).
Shareholders of closely-held corporations often approach their investment in
the corporation differently than their counterparts in publicly-held corpora-
tions. One commentator noted that:
[u]nlike the typical shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who
may be simply an investor or a speculator and does not desire to as-
sume the responsibilities of management, the shareholder in a close
corporation considers himself or herself as a co-owner of the business
and wants the privileges and powers that go with ownership.
1 ONwEA's CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra, § 1.08, at 31. Moreover,
timn a publicly held corporation, power to control the corporation is rel-
atively unimportant to the shareholder-investor; in a close corporation,
the power to control corporate activities or at least to veto changes in
directors, officers and employees and in the methods of operating the
business may be vital to the shareholder-owner.
1 id. at 32.
3. Twelve shareholders owned all of Liberty National Bank's outstanding
stock. Brief for Plaintiff/Appellee NoDak Bancorporation at 2, NoDak Bancor-
poration v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1993) (Nos. 92-2502, 92-2505, 92-
2508, 92-2509). The majority shareholder, Dickinson Bancorporation, owned
approximately 73% of the outstanding stock, NoDak Bancorporation owned ap-
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minority shareholders, who wanted to retain their interest in
the bank and continue their participation in the bank's manage-
ment,5 filed suit to prevent the cash-out transaction. 6 In NoDak
Bancorporation v. Clarke,7 the Eighth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court8 and held that the majority shareholder could cash-
out the minority shareholders.9 In reaching its decision, the
Eighth Circuit expressly rejected an earlier Eleventh Circuit
opinion10 that prohibited cash-outs in national bank mergers.
proximately 21% of the stock, and 10 other individuals owned the remaining 6%
of the stock. Id.
4. Cash-outs are also referred to as take-outs, squeeze-outs, and freeze-
outs. Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective,
56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624, 625 n.3 (1981). Cash-out mergers force minority share-
holders to accept cash for their shares rather than maintain an interest in the
newly merged business. See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAx s OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5:04 (2d ed. 1991) [herein-
after ONEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORTY SHAREHOLDERS] (describing the process
of a cash-out merger transaction). Majority shareholders may execute cash-
outs by transferring their interest to a shell corporation, then approving a
merger of the original corporation with the shell corporation and forcing the
minority shareholders of the original corporation to exchange their interests for
cash. See 1 id. at 23 (describing Matteson v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash.
1952) (en banc), one of the first reported cases in which the majority share-
holder approved a merger with a dummy corporation to eliminate the minority
interest).
5. Prior to the cash-out transaction, all twelve of Liberty National Bank's
shareholders were members of the Board of Directors. Brief for Plaintiff/Appel-
lee NoDak Bancorporation at 6, NoDak (Nos. 92-2502, 92-2505, 92-2508, 92-
2509). After the cash-out transaction, Dickinson Bancorporation was Liberty
National Bank's sole shareholder. Id.
6. Before filing suit, NoDak Bancorporation, one of the minority share-
holders, filed a complaint with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"). NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1418 (8th Cir. 1993).
The OCC is the federal agency charged with approving national bank mergers.
See infra notes 21, 37 and accompanying text (describing the OCC's role in su-
pervising national banks and approving national bank mergers). The com-
plaint filed with the OCC argued that the proposed mergers should be denied
on three grounds: "(1) the proposed merger lacked a legitimate business pur-
pose, (2) [the] majority shareholders had breached their fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders, and (3) the plan would result in a squeeze out of the
minority shareholders for less than fair value." NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418. The
OCC considered and rejected the complaint, and the merger took place in Janu-
ary 1991. Id. NoDak Bancorporation filed suit in federal district court in June
1991. Id.
7. 998 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1993).
8. Id. at 1425. The district court relied on Lewis v. Clark [sic], 911 F.2d
1558 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), for its decision. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1425.
See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discussing Lewis).
9. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1419.
10. Lewis, 911 F.2d at 1558. See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text
(discussing Lewis).
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CASH-OUTS IN BANK MERGERS
NoDak raises the issue of the propriety of cash-out transac-
tions in national bank mergers. Determining the permissibility
of cash-outs holds significant implications for the rights of mi-
nority shareholders. Because cash-out transactions permit ma-
jority shareholders to secure complete control over banks
engaging in such transactions, cash-outs also have a significant
impact on the distribution and control of banking resources.
The control of those resources may, in turn, generate serious
economic ramifications, particularly in rural communities that
depend on a relatively small pool of banking resources to meet
their economic needs.
This Comment argues that the NoDak court reached the
wrong conclusion regarding the permissibility of cash-outs. Part
I of this Comment outlines the history surrounding bank merger
legislation, the interpretation of that legislation by both federal
agencies and courts, and applicable trends in corporate law.
Part H describes the NoDak court's analysis. Part III demon-
strates that the court's opinion is flawed in three respects: it
failed to recognize congressional policy underlying banking leg-
islation, it granted unnecessary deference to federal agency in-
terpretations of that legislation, and it relied on outdated
corporate law regarding cash-out transactions. This Comment
concludes that cash-out transactions in national bank mergers
unnecessarily restrict the rights of minority shareholders and,
when such mergers involve closely-held entities, contradict con-
gressional policy regarding the distribution of banking re-
sources. This Comment proposes prohibiting cash-out
transactions involving closely-held national banks.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING REGULATIONS AND
POLICIES
A. HISTORY OF BANKs AND BmKING
1. Promoting the Diffusion of Banking Resources
Today's banking industry, which consists primarily of small,
closely-held banks," results from congressional policies
11. Small banks are generally defined as those that hold less than $100
million in assets. See DONALD R. FRASER & JAMEs W. KOLARi, THE FUTURE OF
SMALL BANKs IN A DEREGULATED ENwVRoNMENT 2-4 (1985) (citing studies that
characterize banks with less than $100 million in assets as small banks). In
1990, 75% of all banks held less than $100 million in assets. FEDERAL DEPOSrr
INSURANCE CORP., STATISTICS ON BANKING 26 (1990) [hereinafter STATISTICS ON
BANKING]. Although no means exist to precisely identify the total number of
closely-held as opposed to publicly-held banks, the majority of banks are
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designed to limit concentrations of banking resources and to pro-
mote community control over banks. These congressional poli-
cies surfaced shortly after the American Revolution, when many
perceived large, powerful banks as a threat to democracy. 12 In
response to these fears, Congress promoted widespread stock
ownership of the Bank of the United States,'13 the lone federal
bank. The states, too, encouraged the diffusion of bank owner-
closely-held. See PETER S. ROSE, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
BANKING 40-41 (1987) (describing the closely-held nature of most American
banks). For a general description of the importance of small banks to the Amer-
ican economy, see FRASER & KOLARI, supra, at 2-4.
12. Opposition to large banks first arose when Congress approved the char-
ter for the Bank of North America in 1782. EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J.
WHITE, BANKING LAw TEACHING MATERIALS 7 (2d ed. 1984). While opponents of
the federal bank claimed the bank engaged in favoritism, by providing services
only to business people, inherent in their opposition was the belief "that so pow-
erful an institution... contradicted the democratic ideal." Id. The opposition
successfully forced the repeal of the Bank of North America's charter. Id. See
also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To Fail, Too Few To Serve? The Potential
Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IowA L. REv. 957, 969-71 (1992) (describing the
uneasiness Americans have always felt regarding concentrations of banking
power); Betsy Boyce Brainerd, Comment, Northeast Bancorporation, Inc. v.
Board of Governors: Green Light For Regional Interstate Banking, 35 AM. U. L.
REv. 387, 391 (1986) (discussing the distrust Americans have always harbored
for large concentrations of wealth).
Largely due to the efforts of Alexander Hamilton, Congress established an-
other national bank in 1791 when it chartered the First Bank of the United
States. SYMONS & WHrIE, supra, at 11-12. This bank met with similar political
opposition as the Bank of North America, however, and its charter expired
without being renewed. Id. at 13. Congress's last effort to establish a federal
bank occurred in 1816, when Congress approved a charter for the Second Bank
of the United States. Id. This bank, along with its charter, expired due to polit-
ical opposition headed by President Andrew Jackson. Id. at 14, 21. In vetoing
the renewal of the charter of the Second Bank of the United States, President
Jackson stated that "[ilt is easy to conceive that great evils to our country and
its institutions might flow from such a concentration of power in the hands of a
few men." Id. at 16 (quoting President Jackson's message to veto the bank
recharter, July 10, 1832).
13. The charter for the First Bank of the United States prohibited any indi-
vidual from owning more than 1,000 of the 25,000 authorized shares of stock.
Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its Life?, 38
ViLm. L. REv. 1, 54 (1993) (citing the Act to Charter the Bank of the United
States, ch. 10, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 191, 192 (1791), reprinted in 1 DoCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNIMD STATES (Herman E. Krooss ed.,
1969) [hereinafer HISTORY OF BANIaNG AND CURRENCY]). The charter for the
Second Bank of the United States encouraged an even greater diffusion of bank
ownership; the charter prohibited any individual from owning more than 3,000
of the 350,000 authorized shares of bank stock. Id. (citing the Act to Charter
the Second Bank of the United States, ch. 44, §§ 1-2, 3 Stat. 266, 267 (1816),
reprinted in 1 HISTORY OF BANKiNG AN CURRENCY, supra).
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ship through widespread stock ownership. 14 Moreover, the
states promoted increasing the number of banks to support and
further stimulate the expanding American economy. 15 This pro-
cess dispersed banking resources among numerous banks as
well as numerous bank shareholders.
As the economy grew, concentration of banking resources
posed less of a threat to democracy and more of a threat to the
economy. Successful banks provided a positive economic stimu-
lus, but bank failures were economically devastating. 16 Control
of banking resources, therefore, held serious implications for the
economy. Individual bank performance was particularly critical
in small communities dependent on a single bank for their bank-
ing needs.17 Congressional focus turned towards alleviating the
potential debilitating economic effects of banking activities.
2. The National Bank Act
Congress determined that the banking industry needed uni-
formity to provide economic stability.' 8 Consequently, Congress
passed the National Bank Act ("NBA"),19 which provides a uni-
form set of banking regulations 20 and permits banks that com-
ply with the regulations to become national banks. The NBA
14. Felsenfeld, supra note 13, at 56-57 (describing state legislative provi-
sions designed to encourage widespread bank ownership).
15. See SYMONS & WHrTE, supra note 12, at 21 (describing how state gov-
ernments encouraged the establishment of more banks to foster commercial
and industrial growth). Between 1829 and 1834, the total number of state
banks grew from 329 to 506. Id.
16. Lax banking regulations that permitted the over-extension of credit ex-
acerbated the financial pressures of the Revolution. Id. at 6. Similar laxities
led to the depression of 1837. Id. at 22. Numerous bank failures in the 1930s
fueled the Great Depression. Id. at 35-36.
17. During the mid-1800s, "wildcat banking" surfaced in some small, iso-
lated communities where unscrupulous bankers could take advantage of those
requiring banking services. FRASER & KOLAru, supra note 11, at 7.
18. Individual states approved widely varying banking regulations and
permitted various forms of currency. SYMONS & WHrra, supra note 12, at 12-13,
21-23. These various regulations and forms of currency not only created confu-
sion, they also created economic instability. Id. Although strict banking regu-
lations in some states promoted economic stability, lax regulations in other
states led to numerous state bank failures. Id. at 22-23. Consequently, Con-
gress determined that some uniformity in both regulation and currency was
required. Id. at 24.
19. The NBA was originally passed as the National Currency Act of 1863.
SYMONS & WHrrs, supra note 12, at 23. The NBA focused on establishing eco-
nQmic stability, but the driving force behind its passage was the need for fimds
to finance the Civil War. Id. at 24. The NBA is now codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-
220 (1988).
20. The regulations require prospective national banks to:
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also established the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(M0CC"), which supervises all national banks and ensures that
the banks comply with NBA regulations. 21
The NBA also promotes the diffusion of banking resources.
Instead of concentrating all national banking resources in one
central bank, the NBA allows resources to be dispersed across
an unlimited number of national banks.22 The NBA also per-
mits an unlimited number of individuals to form a single na-
tional bank 23 thereby encouraging widespread ownership of
national banking resources.
Although the NBA provides the foundation for establishing
a system of national banks, it does not displace state banks.24
Even today there exists a dual banking system consisting of both
(1) maintain a reserve against deposits, (2) maintain a deposit with the
OCC in return for national bank notes, (3) limit the number of national
bank notes issued, (4) divest their real estate holdings (unless such
holdings are required for the transaction of business or are acquired
through foreclosures), (5) be available as a depository for government
funds, (6) comply with capital requirements and loan restrictions im-
posed by the OCC, and (7) maintain a reserve in proportion to
liabilities.
SYMONS & WHrTE, supra note 12, at 24.
21. Congress created the OCC as a new office in the Treasury Department.
Id. Duties of the OCC include approving requests by national banks to under-
take actions such as establishing branch banks, changing corporate control, or
changing the structure of the organization. 1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, TnE CORuo-
RATE LAW OF BANKS § 1.3.1, at 37 (1988). National bank examiners from the
OCC's office make periodic on-site examinations of national banks to ensure
that the bank's activities comply with regulations. 1 id. at 38.
22. The NBA includes no restrictions on the number of national bank char-
ters that may be issued. See 12 U.S.C. § 21 (describing the procedure for ob-
taining a national bank charter).
23. The precursor to the NBA provided that "associations for carrying on
the business of banking may be formed by any number of persons." Felsenfeld,
supra note 13, at 57 n.285 (quoting Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 5, 12 Stat. 665,
666). The original form of the NBA appeared in the Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106,
13 stat. 99. Currently, the NBA provides that "[aissociations for carrying on
the business of banking... may be formed by any number of natural persons,
not less in any case than five." 12 U.S.C. § 21.
24. SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 12, at 24. Congress did impose substan-
tial taxes on state bank currencies to eliminate state banks. Id. at 25.
Although this move effectively eliminated state-issued currencies, it did not
hinder state bank operations, as state banks began to rely on deposit funds to
finance their daily operations. Id.
178
CASH-OUTS IN BANK MERGERS
state and national banks.25 The majority of banks today, how-
ever, are national banks.26
3. Bank Merger Regulations
As the banking industry continued to develop, banks en-
gaged in more sophisticated transactions, such as mergers. The
NBA in its original form, however, did not specifically permit
merger transactions. Banks seeking to merge were therefore
forced to first dissolve and then jointly request a new charter.27
In response to this trend, Congress amended the NBA to specifi-
cally permit mergers.28 Congress further amended the NBA to
require a public auction of the shares of those stockholders not
wishing to participate in the successor bank.29 Although the
legislative history of the auction provision does not reveal Con-
gress's intent for including the regulation, the auction provision
25. State banks are permitted to be members of the national banking sys-
tem without exchanging their state charters for national charters. Id. at 27.
Participation in the national banking system may include membership in the
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"). Id. The Federal Reserve System was designed to establish a uniform
monetary and credit policy in the wake of the panic years of 1873, 1893, and
1907 when national banks were unable to meet the cash demands of the public.
Id- at 25, 48. The FDIC was created to protect consumer assets after numerous
banks failed during the Depression, and provides insurance for member banks'
deposits so long as the members comply with FDIC regulations. Id. at 36, 43.
The Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the 0CC comprise the three main
federal banking regulatory agencies. Id. at 42.
26. In 1990, there were 50,815 commercial banks and branch offices in the
United States. STATsrcs ON BANKING, supra note 11, at 24-25. Of these,
27,300 had national charters. Id.
27. Congress noted the difficulties associated with such transactions when
it amended the NBA to permit mergers, stating that "[ilt is the purpose of this
bill to remove the necessity of liquidation and permit the consolidation to take
place upon the affirmative vote of the stockholders of each [bank]." H.R. REP.
No. 408, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1918).
28. Id.
29. The public auction provision provides that:
[t]he shares of stock of the consolidated banking association which
would have been delivered to such dissenting shareholders had they
not requested payment shall be sold by the consolidated banking asso-
ciation at an advertised public auction ... and the consolidated bank-
ing association shall have the right to purchase any of such shares at
such public auction, if it is the highest bidder therefor, for the purpose
of reselling such shares within thirty days thereafter to such person or
persons and at such price not less than par as its board of directors by
resolution may determine. If the shares are sold at public auction at a
price greater than the amount paid to the dissenting shareholders, the
excess in such sale price shall be paid to such dissenting shareholders.
12 U.S.C. § 215a(d).
1994]
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coincides with congressional desire to disperse bank ownership
interests. 30
As mergers gained increasing popularity in the 1950s and
1960s,31 Congress recognized the need for additional merger
regulation. Rather than further amend the NBA, Congress
passed the Bank Merger Act ("BMA") 32 and its counterpart, the
Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA7).33 The BMA and the
BHCA provide identical regulations for governing the mergers of
national banks and bank holding companies, 3 4 respectively. The
NBA and the BMA work together to regulate national bank
mergers;3 5 the NBA and the BHCA regulate mergers of banking
holding companies.3 6
The BMA and the BHCA each prohibit mergers that tend
towards monopolization, reduce competition, or restrict trade in
the banking industry.37 The broader goal of the BMA and the
30. Although the public auction provision allows the public a fair opportu-
nity to purchase ownership interests in the successor bank and thus encourages
the diffusion of banking resources, the provision does not guarantee the diffu-
sion of those resources. The provision allows the target bank itself to bid at the
public auction, and will award the target bank shares if it submits the highest
bid. Id.
31. A merger trend developed in the 1950s that continued to grow in the
1960s. SyMONS & WHm, supra note 12, at 510. The trend was based in part
upon the use of mergers and acquisitions to establish branch banks. Id.
32. The BMA, originally passed in 1960, is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). Commentators noted that "[tihe Bank Merger Act of
1960 (BMA) was intended to address the increasing trend toward bank merg-
ers, a development that had troubled Congress for several years prior to the
passage of the act." 2 MALLoY, supra note 21, § 9.2, at 799.
33. The BHCA, originally passed in 1956, is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-
50 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
34. Bank holding companies are companies that hold banks as well as non-
bank subsidiaries. SYmoNs & WHrm, supra note 12, at 341. Although the non-
bank subsidiaries may undertake activities other than banking, those activities
must meet the criteria defined by the BHCA or be closely related to banking.
Id.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 215c(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) states: "Subject to sections
1815(d)(3) and 1828(c) of this title and all other applicable laws, any national
bank may acquire or be acquired by any insured depository institution." The
Supreme Court, in reviewing a proposed merger of national banks shortly after
the BMA was enacted, recognized that the proposed merger was governed by
both the BMA and the NBA. See United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 332 (1963) (discussing proposed bank merger and finding that appli-
cable federal law included 12 U.S.C. § 215 and 12 U.S.C. § 1828).
36. See supra note 35 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 215c(a)).
37. The applicable provision of the BMA prohibits:
(A) any proposed merger transaction which would result in a mo-
nopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination or con-
spiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of
banking in any part of the United States, or
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BHCA, and the impetus behind their passage, is to protect the
economy from the possible detrimental effects of the concentra-
tion of banking resources. 38 The Supreme Court noted that the
legislation "was designed to prevent the concentration of bank-
ing resources in the hands of a few financial giants."3 9 In a sub-
sequent opinion, the Court further commented that the
legislation reflects the nation's traditional desire to disperse the
control of banking 4° and to "[retain] local, community-based con-
trol over banking."41
(B) any other proposed merger transaction whose effect in any sec-
tion of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in
restraint of trade, unless [the responsible regulatory agency] finds that
the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly out-
weighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
12 U.S.C. § 1828(cX5) (1988). An identical provision is included in the BHCA,
12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Comptroller of the Currency
has the authority to approve bank mergers resulting in a national bank. 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1988).
38. SymONS & WHITr, supra note 12, at 174-75. A recent House report
stated that "the fear of concentration of financial power.., led to the passage of
the [BHCA]." H.R. REP. No. 157 (IV), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 104 (1991). The
Senate Report on the amendment to the BHCA in 1956 stated that "adequate
safeguards should be provided against undue concentration of control of bank-
ing activities ... in view of the significant part played by banking in our present
national economy." S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1956), re-
printed in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482.
39. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 46 (1980).
40. Northeast Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 177 (1985).
41. Id. at 160. Several circuit courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have
also acknowledged that the BMA and the BHCA were designed to limit the con-
centration of banking resources. In analyzing the BHCA, the Fifth Circuit
noted that:
[w]hile ... the protection of savings and the extension of credit are
useful and even essential to our economic wellbeing, we as a nation
have often been distrustful of the concentrated economic power that
may accrue to the organizations that provide those services. This feel-
ing ... has been written into the law by Congress; the Bank Holding
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. Sect. 1841 et seq. is an expression of that
sentiment.
Alabama Assoc. of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
533 F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d
729 (5th Cir. 1977), and cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
In County Nat'l Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 654 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit stated
that "the BMA was passed to control the concentration of banking resources."
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B. NATIONAL BANK MERGERS AND THE PERMISSIBmITY OF
CASH-OUTS
Bank merger legislation provides that dissenting sharehold-
ers who do not wish to be associated with the successor bank
may receive cash value for their shares.42 Because cash-out
transactions did not emerge until after passage of both the NBA
and BMA,43 however, neither the NBA nor the BMA specifically
addresses the rights of dissenting stockholders who wish to re-
tain their interest in the successor bank.
42. When the NBA was initially passed to permit bank mergers, the House
Report stated that the law included "[p]roper provision... to protect any dis-
senting stockholder in either corporation, who does not desire to be connected
with the consolidated bank." H.R. EP. No. 408, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1
(1918). The appraisal provision of the NBA provides that protection. The appli-
cable provisions state:
(b) Dissenting shareholders. If a merger shall be voted for at the
called meetings by the necessary majorities of the shareholders of each
association or State bank participating the plan of merger, and there-
after the merger shall be approved by the Comptroller, any share-
holder of any association or State bank to be merged into the receiving
association who has voted against such merger at the meeting of the
association or bank of which he is a stockholder, or has given notice in
writing at or prior to such meeting to the presiding officer that he dis-
sents from the plan of merger, shall be entitled to receive the value of
the shares so held by him when such merger shall be approved by the
Comptroller upon written request made to the receiving association at
any time before thirty days after the date of consummation of the
merger, accompanied by the surrender of his stock certificates.
(c) Valuation of shares. The value of the shares of any dissenting
shareholder shall be ascertained, as of the effective date of the merger,
by an appraisal made by a committee of three persons, composed of (1)
one selected by the vote of the holders of the majority of the stock, the
owners of which are entitled to payment in cash; (2) one selected by the
directors of the receiving association; and (3) one selected by the two so
selected. The valuation agreed upon by any two of the three appraisers
shall govern. If the value so fixed shall not be satisfactory to any dis-
senting shareholder who has requested payment, that shareholder
may, within five days after being notified of the appraised value of his
shares, appeal to the Comptroller, who shall cause a reappraisal to be
made which shall be final and binding as to the value of the shares of
the appellant.
12 U.S.C. § 215a.
43. The use of cash-out transactions in the corporate context did not fully
develop until the 1970s. See Weiss, supra note 4, at 650-57 (describing the de-
velopment of cash-out mergers under state corporate laws). Although it is not
clear when cash-out mergers first arose in the context of national bank mergers,
litigation related to cash-out mergers of national banks did not develop until
the 1980s. See Bloomington Nat'l Bank v. Telfer, 699 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Ind.
1988) (holding that a reverse stock split in a proposed national bank merger
was impermissible). See infra note 58 (describing reverse stock splits).
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1. Agency Interpretations
The OCC, in its role as the regulatory agency responsible for
national bank mergers, has determined that cash-out mergers
are permissible.44 The OCC bases its conclusion on the statu-
tory language in the NBA at section 215a(a)(3), which states
that merger agreements must document "the amount of stock (if
any) to be allocated, and cash (if any) to be paid" to the share-
holders of the target bank.45 According to the OCC, this lan-
guage indicates that Congress anticipated the use of cash as
consideration in mergers and accepted the possibility of cash-out
mergers.46
Traditionally, courts granted great deference to regulatory
agency interpretations. The Supreme Court articulated this
doctrine of deference in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.4 7 In Chevron, the Court held that
when Congress fails to address a specific issue in drafting a stat-
ute, the courts will accept a regulatory agency's interpretation of
the statute so long as it promotes a "permissible" construction of
the regulation.48 A "permissible" construction "represents a rea-
44. The OCC's co-regulator, the Federal Reserve, at one time opposed cash-
out merger transactions. In reviewing a merger proposal between a state mem-
ber bank of the Federal Reserve and a bank holding company, the Federal Re-
serve rejected the request in part because it would result in the cash-out of the
minority shareholders. BoARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 58
FED. RESERVE BULL. 717 (1972). In reaching its decision, the Federal Reserve
stated that "there is an obvious inequity of forcing a result on minority share-
holders without any balancing benefits." Id. at 719. The Federal Reserve ana-
lyzed the proposed merger in light of the relevant statutes (12 U.S.C. § 1828)
and also in light of the impact on the "public interest." Id. The Supreme Court
established the public interest test, according to the Federal Reserve, as the
ultimate test in determining whether a proposed merger should be approved.
Id. (citing United States v. Third Natl Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 184 (1968)).
45. The full text of the NBA states:
The merger agreement shall-specify the amount of the capital stock
of the receiving association, which shall not be less than that required
under existing law for the organization of a national bank in the place
in which it is located and which will be outstanding upon completion of
the merger, the amount of stock (if any) to be allocated, and cash (if
any) to be paid, to the shareholders of the association or State bank
being merged into the receiving association ....
12 U.S.C. § 215a(a).
46. See NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1416, 1419 (8th Cir.
1993).
47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48. Id. at 843. Where Congress has explicitly left a gap in regulations, the
deference due to the agency's interpretation is even greater, for here Congress
intended that the agency fill that gap. Id. at 843-44. Where Congress implic-
itly leaves such a gap, deference due is somewhat less. Id. at 844.
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sonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were commit-
ted to the agency's care"49 and does not contradict congressional
intent as evidenced by the statute or its history.50 When Con-
gress specifically addresses an issue, however, the regulatory
agency must adhere to the language of the statute.51
The Supreme Court's application of the Chevron doctrine,
however, is very uneven. In an exhaustive review of the Court's
post-Chevron decisions, one commentator concluded that the
Court applied the Chevron doctrine in only half of its cases in-
volving regulatory agency interpretations. 52 The Court's incon-
sistent application of the doctrine is evident in the context of
banking legislation.53 In one instance, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's definition
of "insured deposit" while admittedly ignoring the plain lan-
guage of the statute defining such deposits. 54 In another situa-
tion, the Court rejected the Federal Reserve's definition of
"bank" as contained in the BHCA, even though the BHCA pro-
vided no clear definition, and the Federal Reserve's definition
did not appear to be contrary to congressional intent.55 The
Court also rejected the Federal Reserve's definition of "secur-
ity,"56 despite any indication that the definition contradicted
congressional intent. Although the Court has not formally over-
49. Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 842-43.
52. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992). Merrill's study included 90 Supreme Court decisions
from 1984 through 1990 in which at least one Justice acknowledged that a
question of deference to an agency interpretation was present. Id. at 981. Mer-
rill concluded that the Court's failure to consistently apply the doctrine indi-
cates that "the Chevron revolution-although real-is a tenuous one." Id. at
985.
53. See Linda B. Matarese, Has the Chevron Deference Made a Difference
When Courts Review Federal Banking Agency Interpretations of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act?, 33 How. L.J. 195 (1990) (reviewing the deference of courts to the fed-
eral banking agencies before and after Chevron).
54. See FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 427, 438-39 (1986)
(upholding Chevron while deferring to a long-standing definition of "deposit"
developed by the FDIC that does not comport with the statutory definition pro-
vided by Congress).
55. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin.
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1986) (rejecting the Federal Reserve's definition of
"bank").
56. See Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984) (rejecting the Federal Reserve's definition of
"security").
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turned Chevron, it appears hesitant to grant broad interpreta-
tive powers to regulatory agencies as mandated by Chevron.5 7
2. Judicial Interpretations
Prior to NoDak, only one circuit court directly considered
the permissibility of cash-outs in national bank mergers.58 In
Lewis v. Clark [sic], the Eleventh Circuit determined that cash-
outs result in unequal treatment of shareholders of same class
stock.5 9 Cash-outs permit some shareholders to retain their in-
terest in the business, while forcing others out of the business,
namely the minority shareholders. 60 According to the Lewis
court, permitting shareholders of equal standing to be treated
differently "seems to fly in the face of well settled equality-of-
treatment principles."61
57. See Merrill, supra note 52, at 970 (concluding that the Court is afraid of
the "draconian" implications of the Chevron doctrine, which in the extreme
would alter the balance of powers by permitting regulatory agencies to say what
the law is).
58. Two years prior to NoDak, the Supreme Court was presented with an
issue related to cash-out transactions in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991). In Virginia Bankshares, a minority shareholder claimed
that the bank violated the Securities Exchange Act ("SEA") when it issued mis-
leading proxy information to obtain shareholder approval for a cash-out merger
transaction. Id. at 2752-53. The Court addressed only the alleged SEA viola-
tions and whether a minority shareholder could show the causation necessary
to establish compensatory damages. Id- at 2755. The issue of the permissibility
of the cash-out transaction was not before the Court and the Court did not ad-
dress it. Id. at 2749.
In Bloomington Nat'l Bank v. Telfer, 699 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Ind. 1988), the
court was likewise confronted with an issue related to cash-outs, namely, the
impact of a reverse stock split on the appraisal rights of minority shareholders.
Reverse stock splits occur when the majority shareholders approve a reduction
in the number of the corporation's outstanding shares (i.e., every 100 shares
now equal 1 share). 1 ONAi!'s OPPREssIoN oF MINoRITY SHAREHoLDERs, supra
note 4, at § 5:10. The majority shareholders can authorize a reduction so sub-
stantial that minority shareholders are left with fractional shares. 1 id. Many
state corporation laws prohibit fractional shares; thus, the majority sharehold-
ers must then purchase the fractional shares; eliminating the minority's inter-
est in the corporation. 1 id. The Bloomington court found reverse stock splits a
"clever little scheme having only the color of legality," and prohibited the pro-
posed transaction. Bloomington, 699 F. Supp. at 194.
59. 911 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1561. Because same class shareholders were treated equally at
the time Congress approved the NBA, and because neither the legislation itself
nor the history surrounding its passage indicated that Congress "intended to
depart from that tradition," the court refused to allow such unequal treatment.
Id. The court concluded that "if owners of the same class of stock are to be
treated differently, there should be some specific decision to that effect by Con-
gress." Id.
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The court considered and rejected the OCC's argument that
section 215a of the NBA authorizes cash-out transactions be-
cause it permits the use of cash as consideration in mergers.62
According to Lewis, section 215a "merely authorize[s] the use of
cash as consideration for stock in mergers; [it does] not say that
the minority can be required to accept cash where not all stock-
holders are required to accept cash."63 The court further found
that it owed no deference to the OCC, because the agency ex-
ceeded its authority in allowing unequal treatment of same class
shareholders without congressional approval.64
The Lewis court also rejected the district court's reliance on
case law governing publicly-held entities.65 The proposed cash-
out transaction presented in Lewis involved two closely-held
banks.66 Due to the unique nature of closely-held entities, the
Lewis court determined that case law regarding publicly-held
entities did not apply.67
C. CASH-OUTS IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
Due to the structural and transactional similarities between
banks and corporations, 68 courts frequently look to relevant cor-
porate law for guidance in resolving banking issues that bank-
ing legislation did not address. 69 As neither the text of federal
62. Id. at 1560-61.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court cited Bloomington Nat'l Bank v. Telfer, 699 F. Supp. 190
(S.D. Ind. 1988), to support its decision to reject the OCC's position. See supra
note 58 (discussing Bloomington). The Bloomington court rejected the OCC's
determination that reverse stock splits are permissible. Bloomington, 699 F.
Supp. at 193-94.
65. Lewis, 911 F.2d at 1560. The district court relied on Beloffv. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 87 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 1949), and Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufldn
& Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th
Cir. 1975).
66. Lewis, 911 F.2d at 1559-60.
67. Id. at 1560.
68. Banks and corporations are structurally similar in that they are owned
by shareholders and are governed by a board of directors. See 1 MAALY,*supra
note 21, §§ 2.2, 3.2 (describing the chartering process for national banks and
the role of the board of directors). Banks and corporations are transactionally
similar in that they both enter into the same types of transactions, including
mergers. See 2 id. §§ 9.1-9.4 (describing the merger process for national banks).
69. See Gaff v. FDIC, 814 F.2d 311, 315 (6th Cir. 1987), modified, 933 F.2d
400 (6th Cir. 1991) (looking to corporate law to determine whether the plaintiff
had standing to pursue a direct claim for damages against a national bank
under federal banking law); Adato v. Kagan, 599 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (2d Cir.
1979) (same); Schey v. Trans Pacific Natl Bancorporation, 217 Cal. App. 3d 432
(1990) (turning to general rules of corporate law after finding that the NBA was
silent as to the powers of an executive committee); Smart v. Woodward, 441 So.
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bank merger legislation nor its history directly addresses the
permissibility of cash-out mergers,70 corporate law provides an
additional means of evaluating such transactions. Although cor-
porate law governing cash-outs of closely-held entities is most
relevant to the NoDak court's decision, a brief review of the
treatment of minority shareholders in general is necessary to
understand the treatment of minority shareholders in closely-
held entities.
1. Expanding the Rights of Minority Shareholders
The rights of minority shareholders have changed dramati-
cally over time. Traditionally, each shareholder held a vested
right in the corporation. 71 Thus, corporations could not enter
into merger transactions without the unanimous approval of the
shareholders. 72 State legislatures recognized that this approach
severely restricted economic progress, 73 and passed laws that al-
lowed corporations to enter into merger transactions with the
approval of a simple majority of shareholders. 74 Courts inter-
preted these statutes as an authorization of cash-out transac-
tions.75 Consequently, such transactions reduced the rights of
2d 460, 464-65 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (looking to corporate law to define a share-
holder of record in a national bank). See also NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke,
998 F.2d 1416, 1424 (8th Cir. 1993); Lewis, 911 F.2d at 1560 (analyzing corpo-
rate law regulating cash-out mergers).
70. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of
cash-out transactions).
71. Weiss, supra note 4, at 627. This rule was founded on the belief that
the corporate charter was a contract among all the corporation's shareholders.
Id.
72. A single dissenting shareholder could therefore prevent any change to
the corporate form, unless the remaining stockholders could buy the share-
holder out. Id. As a result, the minority shareholders exerted a significant
amount of control over the corporation's acts. Id. The difficulties for the corpo-
ration in attempting to take action were further compounded by the fact that
strike suits were sometimes initiated by minority shareholders who purchased
their shares after the corporation announced its proposed action. Id. at 629
n.31.
73. Corporations that wanted to expand their business into new areas or
acquire existing businesses could not do so unless 100% of their stockholders
agreed to the expansion or acquisition. Id. at 629.
74. Id. Statutes passed in New York, New Jersey, and Delaware permitted
the use of cash as consideration in mergers, but did not expressly permit cash-
out mergers. Id. at 649 n.150. The primary purpose of the statutes was to pro-
vide corporations "with greater flexibility in structuring corporate combina-
tions." Id. at 649.
75. Id. at 641, 648, 650-52. See also 1 ONEAi's OPPRESSION OF MINoMY
SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 4, § 5:03, at 19 n.3 (citing Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962), David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus.,
19941
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minority shareholders to the receipt of fair cash value for their
shares.76
As merger activity increased, courts recognized the harsh-
ness of limiting the minority shareholders' remedy to receiving
cash value for their shares. Difficulties in assessing the value of
the shares, the ability of the majority shareholders to manipu-
late the elements impacting share value, and the increasing use
of cash-outs solely to eliminate minority interests led courts to
fashion remedies to expand the rights of minority sharehold-
ers.7 7 A number of jurisdictions have followed two of those
methods, the fairness test 78 and the business purpose test.79
Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971), and Willcox v. Stem, 219 N.E.2d 401 (N.Y.
1966), for the proposition that courts began interpreting state statutes to allow
cash-out mergers).
76. See Weiss, supra note 4, at 652-54 (discussing the trend in judicial deci-
sions that eventually resulted in limiting the rights of minority shareholders to
a fair appraisal for their shares).
77. See id. at 654-55, 662 (describing the ease with which majority share-
holders can exploit the minority shareholders through cash-out transactions
and the inaccuracy of market prices in valuing shares). See also 1 O NAJL's
OPPRESSION OF MINORTY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 4, at § 3:02 (describing
methods of indirectly eliminating minority shareholder interests, including
withholding dividends, removing the minority shareholders from positions of
employment, and siphoning off profits to interests favorable only to the majority
shareholders). State courts did not react to the rising level of minority share-
holder oppression, however, until the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) sent a strong message calling for additional minor-
ity shareholder protection. See Weiss, supra note 4, at 655-58 (describing the
Santa Fe decision and its impact on corporate cash-out mergers). The Delaware
courts were the first to provide some form of additional relief for minority
shareholders. See Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (determining
that cash-outs designed solely to eliminate the minority shareholders repre-
sented an abuse of the corporate form and a violation of fiduciary duty), over-
ruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (en banc), aff'd, 497
A.2d 792 (Del. 1985). Commentators who viewed cash-outs as a mechanism for
minority shareholder oppression applauded the efforts of the courts to protect
the minority shareholders. See Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Re-
statement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357-58 (1978) (conclud-
ing that cash-outs "involve the distinct possibility that a self-interested
majority stockholder or control group has ruled unfairly, and [cash-outs] re-
quire special safeguards to ensure that minority stockholders receive equal...
treatment.").
78. The Delaware Supreme Court developed the test in Weinberger, 457
A.2d at 711. Because there are a substantial number of corporations chartered
in Delaware, this state developed a large body of corporate law, and its deci-
sions pertaining to corporate transactions typically generate a large following.
Thus far, a number of jurisdictions follow the fairness test, including Maine,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Nevada. See Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument
Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying Nevada law); In re Valu-
ation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1003-05 (Me. 1989);
Walter J. Schloss Assoc. v. The Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 536 A.2d 147, 155-
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Only a limited number of jurisdictions have followed a third
method, the equal treatment doctrine.80
The fairness test prohibits cash-outs if the majority share-
holders fail to deal fairly with the minority shareholders on
either a substantive or a procedural level.81 When the same di-
rectors represent majority shareholders on both sides of the
merger transaction, the directors are "required to demonstrate
their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fair-
ness of the bargain."8 2 Thus, the burden of establishing "fair
57 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); In re Glosser Bros. Inc., 555 A.2d 129, 134-35 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989).
79. The Delaware Supreme Court also developed this test. See Singer v.
Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 975-76, 978-80 (Del. 1977) (holding that courts must
scrutinize merger transactions to determine whether they are fair to the minor-
ity shareholders), overruled by Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. See also Weiss,
supra note 4, at 648-63 (describing the Singer decision and its impact on minor-
ity shareholders). The Delaware courts later rejected this test in favor of the
fairness test developed in Weinberger. Although the Delaware courts aban-
doned the business purpose test, New York and Massachusetts continue to fol-
low the test. As there are a substantial number of corporations chartered in
these two jurisdictions, the business purpose test continues to play a major role
in defining the rights of minority shareholders. See Coggins v. New England
Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (Mass. 1986) (finding that
"[u]nlike the Delaware court... we believe that the 'business purpose' test is an
additional useful means under our statutes and case law for examining a trans-
action in which a controlling stockholder eliminates the minority interest in a
corporation"); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984) (hold-
ing that where the sole purpose of the merger is to reduce the number of share-
holders, cash-outs will be prohibited).
80. The Lewis court relied on this doctrine. See supra notes 59-67 and ac-
companying text (discussing Lewis).
81. The court's inquiry into whether the merger is fair includes analysis of
procedural issues such as the timing of the transaction, how the transaction
was initiated, how the merger was structured, how its terms were negotiated
and disclosed, and how approval of the merger was obtained. Weinberger, 457
A.2d at 711. The merger, however, is also scrutinized for the majority's candor
in dealing with the minority, the possible conflicts of interest, and the potential
for majority shareholders with superior knowledge of corporate information to
mislead the minority shareholders. Id. A showing of fraud or deceit is not nec-
essary to show the unfairness of a deal. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical
Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985) (clarifying the fairness test developed in Wein-
berger), aff'd, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990).
82. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,
91 A.2d 57, 57-58 (Del. 1952)). The court further stated that "[t]he requirement
of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a
transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to
pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts." Id. (citing Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A-2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952); Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680,
681 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970) (per curiam); David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968)).
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dealing" rests on the directors and majority shareholders, as op-
posed to the minority shareholders.
The rights of the minority shareholders expand further
under the business purpose test. The business purpose test per-
mits cash-out transactions only if undertaken for a valid busi-
ness purpose.8 3 According to this test, the elimination of
minority shareholders is not a valid business purpose;84 there-
fore, the test prohibits mergers designed exclusively to eliminate
minority shareholders.8 5 The equal treatment doctrine provides
even greater protection for minority shareholders. This doctrine
requires that all shareholders holding the same class of stock be
Some commentators recommended that the fairness test required in deal-
ings between minority and majority shareholders prior to the merger should
extend to fairness in sharing "merger gains." Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV.
297, 313-23 (1974). Merger gains are those increases in value that accrue as a
result of the merger. Id. at 308-09. Instead of merely providing a pre-merger
share price to those minority shareholders who want to be cashed out, sharing
merger gains would also require that any post-merger gain in stock price be
allocated between the minority and majority shareholders. Id. at 321. At least
one court advocates this approach. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d
1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
83. Singer, 380 A.2d at 978-80, overruled by Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
84. The Singer court stated that a "merger, made for the sole purpose of
freezing out minority stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate process; and [is]
... a... violation of a fiduciary duty" owed by the majority shareholder to the
minority shareholders. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
85. Id. Not all commentators agree that Singer left a lasting impact. Ac-
cording to some commentators, "Singer has been consigned to oblivion .... "
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
ComOATE LAw 136 (1991). But see Richard A. Booth, Management Buyouts,
Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630,
632 n.9 (1985) (arguing that the fairness test now used by the Delaware courts
is equivalent to the business purpose test); Deborah A. DeMott, Down the
Rabbit-Hole and into the Nineties: Issues of Accountability in the Wake of Eight-
ies-Style Transactions in Control, 61 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 1130, 1138 (1993) (ar-
guing that several jurisdictions still require a valid business purpose to support
a cash-out merger transaction); Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective
Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation Of Minor-
ity Shares, 65 NoTmn DAME L. Ruv. 425,436 n.79 (1990) (citing Leader v. Hycor,
Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173 (Mass. 1985), and Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473
N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984), for the proposition that the business purpose test is still
valid in New York and Massachusetts); Mary Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive
Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 404-05 (1985) (describing
the continued compliance of the Delaware courts with the fairness require-
ments outlined in Singer although they have abandoned the business purpose
test).
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treated equally;8 6 thus, it prohibits cash-outs of entities with
only one class of stock.8 7
2. Providing Additional Protection for Minority Shareholders
of Closely-Held Entities
a. Rationale For Providing Additional Protection
Minority shareholders of closely-held corporations typically
receive more protection than their counterparts in publicly-held
corporations. Courts and legislatures alike88 provide this addi-
tional protection in part because no active market exists for the
shares of closely-held corporations.8 9 Absent such a market, val-
uing shares for purposes of cash-out transactions presents diffi-
culties and may result in unfair compensation. 90 Moreover,
cashed out shareholders cannot buy back their shares on the
open market. Thus, the shareholders must rely on the courts, as
opposed to the market, to remedy the effects of cash-out
mergers.
86. Some commentators have called for the adoption of the equal treatment
doctrine as the only method to ensure that majority shareholders treat the mi-
nority fairly. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 77, at 1356 n.9, 1356-57.
87. This doctrine has created much controversy among commentators be-
cause of its similarity to the long abandoned vested rights doctrine. See, e.g.,
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 110-11 (arguing that fair treatment
of shareholders is sufficient; equal treatment of shareholders may not be in the
best interests of the entity).
88. Commentators have also recognized that the differences between
closely-held and publicly-held corporations call for different treatment. See
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Contractual Freedom In Corporate Law: Articles &
Comments; The Structure Of Corporation Law, 89 COLUm. L. REv. 1461 (1989)(arguing that the differences between publicly-held and closely-held corpora-
tions require differing sets of governing rules); Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and
Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NORE
DAME L. Rv. 456 (1985) (arguing that the business judgment rule, which typi-
cally acts to validate decisions made by corporate directors to enter into cash-
out merger transactions, should not apply to closely-held corporations as the
rule is premised on the concept that dissenting shareholders can voice their
approval or disapproval by buying and selling the corporation's stock on the
open market).
89. See WiLL L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS CASES
AND MATERaIAs 1195-96 (6th ed. 1988) (describing the breakdown of traditional
reasoning regarding the ability of cashed out shareholders to repurchase their
shares when there is no available market for those shares). See also Exadak-
tilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 400 A.2d 554, 560-61 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979) (determining that rationale underlying a state statute affording
additional protection to shareholders of closely-held corporations is grounded
on the inability of such shareholders to remedy the situation by selling their
shares on the open market and the confidential relationships that typically ex-
ist among shareholders of closely-held corporations).
90. 1 O' F N's CLOSE ComORATIONS, supra note 2, § 1.08.
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The close and confidential relationships that exist among
shareholders of closely-held corporations present yet another
reason for providing additional protection to such sharehold-
ers.91 Such relationships may create a dependency on fellow
shareholders or on the corporation itself; the shareholders may
rely on the corporation for their means of employment or their
position in the community. 92 Cash-out transactions, therefore,
may have a detrimental impact on the shareholders' earning po-
tential or status in the community.
b. Methods of Providing Additional Protection
Courts provide additional protection to minority sharehold-
ers of closely-held corporations in several different forms. Some
courts limit the application of the business purpose test to
closely-held corporations.93 Other courts apply an expanded
version of the business purpose test to closely-held corporations,
holding that even when the business purpose test is met, share-
holders of closely-held corporations can protest the merger on
the grounds that the same goal could be achieved with a less
adverse impact on the minority's interest.94 Still other courts
hold that the confidential relationships among shareholders of
closely-held corporations demand a higher level of fiduciary duty
among such shareholders than exists among shareholders of
publicly-held corporations. 95
91. 1 id.
92. One commentator noted the importance of the closely-held corpora-
tion's ability to provide employment for the shareholders:
Employment by the corporation is often the shareholder's principal or
sole source of income. Providing for employment may have been the
principal reason why the shareholder participated in organizing the
corporation. Even if shareholders in a close corporation anticipate an
ultimate profit from the sale of shares, they usually expect (or perhaps
should expect) to receive an immediate return in the form of salaries as
officers or employees of the corporation rather than in the form of divi-
dends on their stock.
1 id. § 1.08, at 31-32. Even when the shareholder is not dependent on the cor-
poration for employment, participation in the corporation may provide the
shareholder with a certain social prestige. 1 id.
93. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins, Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.
1974) (applying Georgia law and holding that the business purpose test was not
met when the majority shareholders of a closely-held corporation attempted to
effect a cash-out merger by merging with a shell corporation).
94. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1975).
95. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-15
(Mass. 1975) (holding that the similarities between closely-held corporations
and partnerships require that stockholders in the close corporation owe one an-
other substantially the same fiduciary duty that partners owe to one another).
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State legislatures also recognize that different rules should
apply to closely-held corporations than to publicly-held corpora-
tions. At least one state requires unanimous shareholder ap-
proval of any merger of a closely-held corporation.96 Other
states, including North Dakota, permit courts to dissolve closely-
held corporations when the majority shareholders have treated
the minority shareholders unfairly.97
II. NODAK BANCORPORATION V. CLARKE
In NoDak Bancorporation v. Clarke,98 the Eighth Circuit
addressed the issue of cash-outs in national bank mergers. The
96. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4-601 (1993).
97. The North Dakota statute provides that the courts may dissolve corpo-
rations when "[t]he directors or those in control of the corporation have acted
fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more
shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, or officers, or as em-
ployees of a closely held corporation." N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-115(1)(b)(2)
(1993). The statute further provides that:
[i]n determining whether to order equitable relief or dissolution, the
court shall take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a
closely held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and
reasonable manner in the operation of the corporation and the reason-
able expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the inception and
develop during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the
corporation and with each other.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(3) (1993).
See also N.J. Rlv. STAT. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (1993) (granting courts the power
to dissolve corporations with 25 or fewer shareholders when those in control of
the corporation treated one or more of the minority shareholders unfairly); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-18-400(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (granting courts the power to
dissolve closely-held corporations when those in control of the corporation acted
in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the minority shareholders). Other states
provide that courts can dissolve closely-held corporations at the request of a
complaining shareholder where dissolution is necessary to protect the rights or
interests of the complaining shareholder. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1800(a)(2),
1800(b)(5) (Deering 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1104-a(b)(2) (Consol. 1993).
California provides some additional protection by requiring that cash-out merg-
ers of corporations in which the majority shareholders own more than 50% but
less than 90% of the corporation be approved by the California Commissioner of
Corporations. 1 O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINOR=TY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note
4, § 5:04. The Commissioner must determine if the terms and conditions of the
merger are fair, just, and equitable. 1 id. The drafter of the California provi-
sion stated that "there will probably be relatively few transactions in which...
[the commissioner] will be willing to make the finding of fairness." 1 id. (quot-
ing 2 MARsH's CALIFORNIA CoRn'. LAw § 18.24, at 529). Many states grant au-
thority to the courts to dissolve closely-held corporations when the majority
shareholders oppress the interests of the minority. See WiuLI H. PAINTER,
BusiNEss PLANNING PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 125-26 (3d ed. 1994) (stating
that 37 states grant courts the power to dissolve closely-held corporations when
those in control of the corporation oppress the minority shareholders).
98. 998 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1993).
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majority shareholder of the closely-held Liberty National Bank
("Liberty"), Dickinson Bancorporation ("Dickinson"), established
a separate interim bank to facilitate a merger transaction.99
Dickinson, acting as the majority shareholder of Liberty, then
approved a cash-out merger transaction with the interim bank
that would eliminate the interests of all minority shareholders,
including NoDak Bancorporation ("NoDak").' 00 The successor
bank appeared identical in all respects to the original Liberty
except that Dickinson was its sole shareholder.' 0 '
NoDak, a closely-held corporation whose principal share-
holder served as a member of Liberty's Board of Directors,10 2
objected to the merger. NoDak wanted to retain its active role in
managing and directing Liberty's activities. NoDak alleged that
the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty' 03 to the
minority shareholders, and that federal banking legislation pro-
hibited cash-out merger transactions. The NoDak court did not
specifically address the allegations of the breach of fiduciary
duty, but acquiesced in the OCC's determination that the
merger was permissible.' 0 4
The NoDak court's analysis focused primarily on the intro-
ductory language of the NBA at section 215a(a). 0 5 The court
99. Id. at 1417.
100. Id. The use of a shell corporation established by the majority share-
holders to facilitate a merger and eliminate the interests of the minority share-
holders is a typical form of a cash-out transaction. See supra note 4 (describing
cash-out transactions). This form as used in NoDak permitted the successor
bank to operate under the existing name of Liberty National Bank and to as-
sume all the operations of the existing Liberty National Bank. NoDak, 998
F.2d at 1417-18.
101. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418.
102. Brief for Plaintiff/Appellee NoDak Bancorporation at 2, NoDak (Civil
Action No. A1-91-163).
103. NoDak Bancorporation alleged, among other things, that Liberty delib-
erately distorted its financial position shortly before the merger to adversely
impact the appraisal value of the minority's shares, intentionally withheld divi-
dends to finance the anticipated cash-out of the minority, and initiated and ap-
proved the merger transaction without the knowledge of the minority
shareholders. Brief for Plaintiff]Appellee NoDak Bancorporation at 3-5, NoDak
(Nos. 92-2502, 92-2505, 92-2508, 92-2509).
104. In discussing the allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, the court
stated that "the Comptroller [OCC] found that the merger plan met all the pro-
cedural requirements of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a) and (b),
and the Comptroller [OCC] would not impose additional requirements."
NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418. Without reviewing the allegations, the court held
that the OCC's decision regarding the cash-out was permissible. Id. at 1419.
105. The portion of the text analyzed by the court is at 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a):
"[Olne or more national banking associations or one or more State banks, with
the approval of the Comptroller, under an agreement not inconsistent with this
194 [Vol. 79:173
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found this language significant because it permits OCC-ap-
proved mergers that are "not inconsistent" with the NBA.' 0 6 In-
voking the Chevron doctrine, 0 7 the court concluded that the
OCC's interpretation of section 215a(a)(3) of the NBA as con-
gressional authorization of cash-outs was not inconsistent with
the NBA.' 08 Accordingly, NoDak held that cash-outs are
permissible.'0 9
The court considered and rejected NoDak's argument that
cash-outs are inconsistent with section 215a(d) of the NBA. This
section mandates that "[the shares of stock of the [successor
bank] which would have been delivered to such dissenting
shareholders had they not requested payment shall be sold...
at an advertised public auction."" 0 The court held that this pro-
vision applies only when the successor bank initially offers stock
to the dissenting shareholders, but the shareholders specifically
request cash payment."' Because, in NoDak, the successor
bank never offered stock to the dissenting stockholders, the
court held that this provision did not apply to the Liberty
merger. 112
The court further found that the legislative history sur-
rounding the NBA supported its holding permitting cash-
outs."i 3 The court determined that Congress's primary goal in
passing the NBA was to expedite national bank mergers. 1 4 The
subchapter, may merge into a national banking association located within the
same State, under the charter of the receiving association."
106. The court commented that [ilt is significant that the statutory lan-
guage uses a double negative, allowing any type of merger agreement 'not in-
consistent with this subchapter.'" NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1419.
107. Id. at 1420. The court invoked the doctrine because it found that one of
the provisions of the NBA, § 215a(a)(3), was "susceptible to the two different
readings offered by the litigants." Id See supra note 45 (citing the full text of
the statute). Dickinson and the OCC argued that the mention of two different
forms of compensation indicated that either form was acceptable, and that
cash-outs are therefore permissible. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420. NoDak argued




110. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(d). See supra note 29 (citing the full text of the
statute).
111. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420.
112. Id. The court also found that the mandatory appraisal provision at 12
U.S.C. § 215a(c) adequately protected the interests of the minority sharehold-
ers, making the protection provided by the public auction provision unneces-
sary. Id. See supra note 42 (citing the full text of § 215a(c)).
113. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1422-23.
114. Id. at 1422. The court reviewed the 1918 amendment to the NBA,
which permitted mergers, as well as more recent amendments made in 1952
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court reasoned that cash-out transactions expedite mergers by
removing possible delays caused by minority shareholder
disapproval.115
Finally, the NoDak court looked to relevant case law regard-
ing cash-out transactions. The court expressly rejected the rea-
soning and holding of Lewis. 116 NoDak found the Lewis court's
reasoning that same class shareholders be treated equally tan-
tamount to recognizing that all shareholders possess vested
rights in the business." 7 Citing a treatise on corporate law, the
court found that authorities abandoned this view in favor of the
"modern" view that minority shareholders' rights include only
the right to the fair cash value of their shares."" The court
therefore found that modern corporate law further supported its
holding that cash-outs are permissible. 119 The NoDak dissent,
however, found the Lewis court's reasoning persuasive. The dis-
sent agreed with Lewis that the tradition of equitable treatment
for minority shareholders that existed at the time Congress
passed the NBA required adherence to that tradition unless
Congress explicitly authorized a departure. 120 According to the
dissent, because Congress had not expressly allowed such a de-
parture, cash-out mergers are impermissible.121
and 1959. The court determined that these amendments were designed "to en-
courage bank consolidation." Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1423. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discussing
the Lewis holding).
117. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1423.
118. Id. at 1423-24 (citing Weiss, supra note 4, at 690-91; EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 134).
119. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1423-24. The court found further support for its
decision in Bloomington Nat'l Bank v. Telfer, 699 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
See supra notes 58, 64 (discussing Bloomington). In dicta, the Bloomington
court indicated that minority shareholders may be cashed out so long as they
are given appraisal rights. Bloomington, 699 F. Supp. at 194. The Lewis court
relied upon this same decision in reaching its conclusion that cash-outs are im-
permissible. See supra note 64 (discussing the Lewis court's reliance on Bloom-
ington as authority for rejecting the OCC's position.)
120. The dissent stated that "[t]he majority has, in fact, found no traces that
Congress intended to depart from this tradition, but bases its inequitable treat-
ment of the minority shareholder in this case on an unjustified obeisance to the
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Im. AN ALTERNATE ANALYSIS OF THE
PERMISSIBILITY OF CASH-OUTS
In reaching its conclusion that cash-outs in national bank
mergers are permissible, NoDak made three critical errors.
First, the court failed to acknowledge congressional policy un-
derlying bank merger regulations regarding the distribution of
banking resources. Second, the court misapplied the Chevron
doctrine. Third, the court failed to recognize the most recent
trend in state law governing corporate mergers. Consequently,
the court reached the wrong result regarding the permissibility
of cash-outs.
A. BANKING LEGISLATION INDICATES CASH-OUTS ARE
IMPERMSSMLE
The NoDak court's analysis of the permissibility of cash-
outs focused on whether cash-out mergers are "inconsistent"
with the NBA.122 The court's analysis, however, failed to con-
sider congressional policy inherent in the NBA. Consequently,
NoDak misinterpreted two critical provisions of the NBA, sec-
tions 215a(d) and 215a(c). Moreover, the court misread the leg-
islative history surrounding the NBA and ignored the
applicability of the BMA.
1. Cash-Outs are Inconsistent with Congressional Policy
The long history leading up to the NBA's passage indicates
congressional suspicion of large concentrations of banking re-
sources. 123 Although Congress did not contemplate mergers
when it initially approved the NBA, congressional distrust of
concentrated resources did manifest itself in the NBA in two re-
spects: the NBA encourages the diffusion of banking resources
across both an unlimited number of national banks and an un-
limited number of bank shareholders. Cash-out mergers con-
centrate banking resources among fewer shareholders, namely
the majority shareholders, and therefore contradict Congress's
desire to disperse banking resources across numerous bank
shareholders. 124 Prohibiting cash-outs, on the other hand, alle-
viates the effects of concentrated resources. Although such
122. Id. at 1419.
123. See supra notes 11-43 and accompanying text (describing the historical
background of the NBA).
124. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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mergers still reduce the total number of banks, 125 they do not
reduce the number of bank shareholders. Rather than concen-
trating resources in the hands of the majority shareholders,
these mergers represent a combination of resources, with the
same number of shareholders controlling the total amount of re-
sources both before and after the merger.126
Some cash-out transactions may produce a limited impact
on the concentration of resources among majority shareholders.
Resources of banks with a multitude of shareholders remain
widely dispersed among the large number of majority sharehold-
ers even after a cash-out merger. 127 When one or more of the
bank's remaining shareholders is itself a corporation with
widely dispersed shares, there may be little danger of resource
concentration among majority shareholders. Moreover, the ef-
fects of a cash-out may be eliminated if the bank's stock remains
available on the open market and the successor bank does not
act to reduce its number of outstanding shares. Cashed out
shareholders may simply repurchase their shares on the market
125. Mergers achieved through the use of shell banks would not reduce the
total number of banks as the shell is created only to facilitate the merger. See
supra note 4 (describing the use of a shell corporation to accomplish a merger).
126. A simple example illustrates the point. In a potential merger of Target
Bank and Successor Bank, each with $100 million in assets, the concentration
of those assets among shareholders depends entirely on whether cash-outs are
permitted or prohibited. If Target Bank and Successor Bank each have only
two shareholders prior to the merger, one representing a 90% interest and an-
other a 10% interest, the total of the assets of the two banks is $200 million,
controlled by four separate shareholders. After a merger that prohibits cash-
outs, Successor Bank holds $200 million in assets, still controlled by four share-
holders, as was the case prior to the merger. After a merger that permits cash-
outs, Successor Bank has $180 million in assets, now controlled by only two
shareholders ($20 million having been paid out to the minority shareholders).
If the minority shareholders are able to reinvest their cash in the bank, this
process redistributes control. When the cash-out involves a closely-held entity
(such as Liberty National Bank), however, the minority shareholders would be
unable to repurchase their interest in the bank. See infra notes 127-129 (dis-
cussing the implications of cash-outs for closely-held corporations).
The concentration of resources compounds as Successor Bank increases in
value (which, presumably, is what the majority shareholders anticipate when
they approve the cash-out). When Successor Bank increases in value to $250
million, in a cash-out scenario each of the remaining two shareholders controls
$125 million. If the cash-out is prohibited, when Successor Bank reaches $250
million, each of the majority shareholders controls only $112.5 million, while
each of the minority shareholders controls $12.5 million. The concentration of
wealth in the hands of the majority shareholders in a cash-out scenario contin-
ues to increase as the value of Successor Bank increases.
127. Cash-outs may even be desirable when widespread ownership encum-
bers the corporation's decision making process or increases the dificulty of com-
munication to shareholders.
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after the merger. In such cases, cash-out transactions do not de-
feat congressional policy regarding the diffusion of banking re-
sources and are therefore permissible.
These mitigating factors are rarely present in cash-out
transactions involving closely-held banks. The stock of such
banks is typically not widely dispersed and is not readily avail-
able for repurchase on the market. 128 These mitigating factors
certainly did not exist in the NoDak case. Prior to the cash-out,
only twelve shareholders owned Liberty stock.129 Although two
of those shareholders were corporations, NoDak and Dickinson,
both were closely-held corporations with a limited number of
shareholders. 13 0 Thus, Liberty's stock was never widely dis-
persed and remained significantly concentrated after the
merger, when Dickinson became its sole shareholder. Moreover,
the cashed out shareholders of the closely-held Liberty had no
opportunity to repurchase their shares on the open market.
Consequently, the effect of the merger could not be alleviated.
The NoDak court's decision to permit the cash-out of Liberty's
minority shareholders, therefore, directly contradicts congres-
sional policy regarding the concentration of banking
resources.
131
2. Cash-Outs Defeat the Minority's Election of Cash or Stock
The NoDak court's failure to recognize congressional con-
cern regarding the distribution of banking resources led it to
misinterpret a critical regulation of the NBA, section 215a(d).
128. See supra note 2 (describing the characteristics of closely-held
corporations).
129. Supra note 3.
130. See Brief for PlaintiffWAppelee NoDak Bancorporation at 2, NoDak
(Nos. 92-2502, 92-2505, 92-2508, 92-2509) (describing the stockholders of Dick-
inson as six related individuals along with one F.L. Clarkson and his affiliates);
Brief for PlaintifffAppellee NoDak Bancorporation at 2, NoDak (Civil Action No.
A1-91-163) (describing one F.G. Larson as the principal shareholder, officer,
and director of NoDak Bancorporation).
131. There may be instances in which the majority shareholders justifiably
wish to eliminate the minority shareholders. When minority shareholders be-
come belligerent and uncooperative, or when personality conflicts between the
majority and minority shareholders severely impair the operations of the busi-
ness, the majority shareholders may wish to remove the minority shareholders.
This Comment, however, does not propose that the courts permit or deny cash-
outs in such instances based on the equities of the shareholders' positions.
Rather, this Comment suggests that the shareholders themselves resolve such
conflicts through the use of buy-out arrangements, arbitration clauses, or in the
extreme, dissolution of the entity. See 1 OW'N L's OPPRESSION OF MINORrrY
SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 4, § 9 (describing methods of resolving dissension
and deadlock in closely-held entities).
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This provision states that "[tihe shares of stock of the [successor
bank] which would have been delivered to such dissenting share-
holders had they not requested payment shall be sold ... at an
advertised public auction." 32 The NoDak court determined that
this provision applies only when the successor bank initially of-
fers stock to the minority shareholders but those shareholders
specifically request cash payment. 33 The provision does not ap-
ply, according to NoDak, to cash-out transactions in which the
successor bank never offers stock to the minority sharehold-
ers.134 The court offered no support for its conclusion other than
the plain language of the statute.-3 5
There is, however, an alternate interpretation of the plain
language of the statute. The statute could be construed to mean
that minority shareholders are entitled to receive stock in the
successor bank unless they request cash payment.' 36 Because
cash-out transactions do not offer shareholders the choice be-
tween stock or cash payment, the provision thus interpreted in-
dicates that cash-outs are impermissible. Indeed, unlike
NoDak's interpretation, this alternate interpretation of the stat-
ute conforms with the policy of preventing concentrations of
banking resources by prohibiting cash-outs.
The NoDak court's interpretation of section 215a(d) is incon-
sistent not only with congressional policy regarding the distribu-
tion of resources, but also with the preceding provision of the
NBA, section 215a(c). According to this provision, "any dissent-
132. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(d) (emphasis added). See supra note 29 (citing the full
text of the statute).
133. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. This interpretation is well established for mergers involving bank hold-
ing companies. In describing the application of federal banking law to a merger
between a shell corporation established by a bank holding company and an ex-
isting bank, the author of a leading textbook on banking law stated:
In exchange for their shares of the target bank, the shareholders will
have the choice between receiving shares of the bank holding company
[the successor] or payment of the fair market value of their stock if
they elect to pursue their appraisal rights under state or federal law
.... The purpose of [a] merger between a phantom bank subsidiary [of
a bank holding company] and the target bank is to eliminate minority
shareholder interests in the resulting subsidiary bank. This does not
necessarily mean a 'freeze out" of minority stockholders in the organiza-
tion of the [bank holding company]. All shareholders of the target bank
have the alternative of taking [bank holding company] stock in ex.
change for their own stock.
JAMEs J. WHITE, BANING LAw TEACHING MATERLus 273 (1976) (emphasis
added).
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ing shareholder who has requested payment" for his or her
shares may request a reappraisal if dissatisfied with the initial
share appraisal value. 137 Extending NoDak's interpretation of
section 215a(d) to this provision, minority shareholders in cash-
out mergers are not entitled to reappraisal rights, because they
did not request payment for their shares. Aware of the inequity
of this result, the NoDak court found that although the auction
provision of section 215a(d) does not apply to cash-out mergers,
the reappraisal rights incorporated into section 215a(c) apply to
all types of mergers. 138 Again, the court offered no support for
this distinction other than the plain language of the statute.139
Such a distinction is unnecessary, however, under the alter-
nate interpretation of section 215a(d), which permits minority
shareholders to retain their interest in the successor bank un-
less they request payment. Under this interpretation, both sec-
tions 215a(c) and 215a(d) apply to all merger transactions.
Moreover, this interpretation complies with congressional policy
regarding the distribution of banking resources.
3. The Public Auction Provision Encourages the
Redistribution of Resources
NoDak further reasoned that, because section 215a(d) of the
NBA does not apply to cash-out transactions, cash-out mergers
do not require public auctions. 140 According to the court, there-
fore, public auctions are only required when dissenting stock-
holders are initially offered stock but instead request cash;
auctions are not required when dissenting shareholders are
never offered stock. The court offered no rationale for this
distinction.
An alternate interpretation of the public auction provision
demonstrates that the auction promotes congressional policy en-
couraging the diffusion of banking resources. Public auctions
permit the redistribution of resources consolidated among ma-
137. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(c) (emphasis added).
138. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420-21.
139. Id. at 1420. The court found the distinction appropriate because, ac-
cording to the court, the reappraisal provision relates to the value of shares
held in the target bank prior to the merger and the auction provision relates to
shares held in the successor bank. Id. at 1420-21. The NoDak court ignored
the fact that § 215a(d) expressly requires the reappraisal value to be adjusted
to equal the auction price should the auction price exceed the reappraisal value.
12 U.S.C. § 215a(d). Thus, the reappraisal value of shares in the target bank is
equivalent to the shares in the successor bank, and the NoDak court's distinc-
tion breaks down.
140. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1420-21.
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jority shareholders when the dissenting shareholders do request
cash in exchange for their shares. Rather than simply allowing
the majority shareholders to retain control of those shares, pub-
lic auctions allow others to purchase interests in the successor
bank and thus encourage the redistribution of resources.14 '
NoDak's decision that the public auction requirement does not
apply to certain mergers thus frustrates Congress's attempt to
redistribute banking resources.
4. Bank Merger Legislative History Does Not Support Cash-
Outs
Although the NoDak court ignored the underlying policies of
the NBA regarding the concentration of banking resources, it
did examine the legislative history of the NBA amendment per-
mitting mergers. After reviewing the House Report accompany-
ing the amendment, the NoDak court determined that it was
designed to facilitate mergers and "make it easier for banks to
consolidate." 42 According to the House Report, however, the
purpose of the amendment was merely to "permit" mergers to
take place.' 43 The NoDak court, therefore, mistakenly relied on
the history of the NBA as a vehicle to make mergers "easier." i 44
141. The public auction provision is therefore critical in transactions of
closely-held entities such as Liberty. Absent a public auction, there are no
ready means for shareholders to purchase stock in closely-held entities. See
supra notes 88-89 (describing alternate treatment afforded shareholders of
closely-held corporations because of the absence of a ready market for their
shares).
142. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1422. Even if the intended purpose of the NBA is
to make mergers easier, the NoDak court made the erroneous assumption that
permitting cash-outs achieves this purpose. The NoDak court apparently be-
lieved that prohibiting cash-outs would allow the minority shareholders to ef-
fectively stonewall the merger by refusing to give their consent to the
transaction. Prohibiting cash-outs, however, does not increase the voting power
of the minority shareholders. The majority shareholders can still approve of a
merger transaction without the consent of the minority, whether or not a cash-
out merger is permitted. The permissibility of cash-out transactions does, how-
ever, affect the number of steps required to complete the merger transaction.
Applying the NoDak court's reasoning to the typical cash-out merger, the steps
required to complete the merger would include: 1) majority shareholder ap-
proval of the merger, 2) appraisal of the minority shareholders' interests, 3)
reappraisal of the minority shareholders' interests if the minority shareholders
are dissatisfied with the initial appraisal, 4) transfer of shares from the target
bank to the successor bank. If cash-outs are prohibited, both steps two and
three may be eliminated if minority shareholders do not request cash value for
their shares. Far from making mergers easier, therefore, the court's decision to
permit the cash-out transactions may actually lengthen the merger process.
143. H.R. REP. No. 408, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1918).
144. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1422.
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The NoDak court also failed to recognize the applicability of
the BMA. The NBA specifically states that the NBA and the
BMA govern all national bank mergers. The Supreme Court in-
terpreted the BMA to prefer "community-based control" of bank-
ing resources.' 45 A significant decline in the number of bank
owners from the community in which the bank is located threat-
ens community-based control. Because Liberty's merger re-
sulted in the elimination of all but one of its shareholders, the
NoDak court's decision to permit the cash-out merger signifi-
cantly diminished community-based control over the bank, thus
contravening the preference for community-based control of
banking resources outlined in the BMA.
B. DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS
1. Improper Application of the Chevron Doctrine
The Eighth Circuit made its second critical mistake in
granting deference to the OCC's interpretation of the NBA. The
NoDak court based this deference on the Chevron doctrine. It is
not entirely clear, however, whether this doctrine even ap-
plies.' 46 The Supreme Court has refused to apply the Chevron
doctrine in numerous cases involving regulatory agency inter-
pretations.' 47 Moreover, on two separate occasions the Supreme
Court flatly rejected the statutory interpretations of bank regu-
latory agencies, even though Congress provided no clear indica-
tion of its intent.' 48 Although the Court has not expressly
rejected the Chevron doctrine, its failure to consistently apply
the doctrine makes its use questionable.
Even if application of the Chevron doctrine is appropriate,
the Eighth Circuit used the doctrine inappropriately in NoDak.
Courts should defer to regulatory agencies only when their in-
terpretations represent a "reasonable accommodation of conflict-
ing policies . . . committed to the agency's care." 49 Congress
authorized the 0CC to evaluate the financial positions of merg-
ing banks and the external effects of proposed mergers, includ-
ing the potential impact on competition and on banking services
145. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court's uneven application of the Chevron doctrine).
147. Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
148. Supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
149. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467




provided to the community.150 If the 0CC finds the merging
banks in sound financial condition and finds no adverse external
effects of the proposed merger, the OCC can approve the
merger.151
No evidence indicates, however, that Congress authorized
the OCC to evaluate the internal effects of mergers. 152 Mergers
that adversely impact bank employees or, as in NoDak, mergers
that adversely impact some of the bank's shareholders raise is-
sues beyond the scope of the OCC's authority. When issues be-
yond the scope of the agency's duties surface, the Chevron
doctrine does not require the courts to defer to the agency. 153
Rather, the courts must resolve those questions. The NoDak
court, therefore, should have resolved the dispute concerning
the impact of the proposed cash-out on Liberty's minority share-
holders without deferring to the OCC. Although the court could
certainly have deferred to the OCC's findings regarding Lib-
erty's financial position and the external impacts of the merger,
issues Congress expressly granted to the OCC's care, the court
should have undertaken its own analysis regarding the permis-
sibility of cash-outs.
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1988) grants this authority by stating that:
[tihe responsible agency shall not approve-any proposed merger
transaction which would result in a monopoly.., or any other pro-
posed merger transaction whose effect ... may be substantially to
lessen competition .... In every case, the responsible agency shall
take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and fu-
ture prospects of the existing and proposed institutions ....
151. The OCC's authority to approve mergers is located at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c)(2)(A), which states that "[nlo insured depository institution shall
merge or consolidate with any other insured depository institution... except
with the prior written approval of the responsible agency, which shall be ... the
Comptroller of the Currency [OCC] if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting
bank is to be a national bank."
152. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (identifying the duties of
the OCC, which do not include evaluation of internal impacts of mergers or
fairness considerations). The OCC's own regulations indicate that the factors it
considers in approving bank mergers are limited. Factors to be considered
include:
(i) The effect of the transaction upon competition; (ii) The convenience
and needs of the community to be served; (iii) The financial history of
the merging [banks]; (iv) The condition of the merging [banks], includ-
ing capital, management and earnings prospects; (v) The existence of
insider transactions; and (vi) The adequacy of disclosure of the terms of
the merger.
12 C.F.R. § 5.33(b)(2) (1994).
153. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383).
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2. Application of the Chevron Doctrine Does Not Support the
OCC's Position
Even if the use of the Chevron doctrine in NoDak is appro-
priate, its application indicates that the OCC's position regard-
ing cash-outs cannot be supported. According to the Chevron
doctrine, the courts may defer to an agency's interpretation un-
less the text or history surrounding passage of the statute indi-
cate that Congress would not sanction the interpretation.
15 4
Here, both the text and the history of banking legislation indi-
cate that Congress would not have advocated cash-outs.
The NBA at section 215a(d) provides that "It]he shares of
stock of the [successor bank] which would have been delivered to
such dissenting shareholders had they not requested payment
shall be sold... at an advertised public auction."155 This provi-
sion strongly suggests that Congress intended dissenting share-
holders to receive stock in the successor bank unless they
request cash payment, and therefore indicates that Congress
would not sanction the use of cash-outs in bank merger transac-
tions. The long established congressional policy of encouraging
the diffusion of banking resources also indicates that Congress
would not advocate cash-out transactions. 15 6 The OCC's deter-
mination that cash-outs are permissible, therefore, contradicts
the text of the relevant statute as well as congressional policy.
Consequently, even under the Chevron doctrine, the NoDak
court should have disregarded the OCC's interpretation of bank-
ing legislation.
C. BORROWING FROM CORPORA.TE LAW
In its final misstep, the NoDak court looked to obsolete cor-
porate law to support its decision that cash-out transactions are
permissible. The court looked to the "modern view" of cash-
outs157 and determined that "the [minority] shareholders' only
entitlement is to demand an appraisal of their shares."158 The
154. Id.
155. 12 U.S.C. § 215a(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
156. See supra notes 12-41 (discussing historical background of banking
legislation).
157. North Dakota courts have not developed a body of case law pertaining
to cash-out mergers; the NoDak court therefore turned to what it considered
general trends in corporate law for guidance.
158. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1424 (quoting EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
85, at 134). The majority opinion overlooked a later section in this work de-
voted exclusively to closely-held corporations. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 85, at 228-52. The authors state that a separate line of analysis is often
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court failed to recognize that the more recent trend in corporate
law expands the rights of minority shareholders, particularly
shareholders of closely-held entities such as Liberty.
1. The Modern View of Corporate Cash-Outs
The fairness test stands as the most widely accepted means
of analyzing cash-out mergers in corporations.' 59 To pass this
test, the majority must demonstrate that it dealt fairly with the
minority shareholders in completing the merger. 160 The NoDak
court's opinion sheds little light on this issue. Indeed, despite
NoDak's allegations that the majority shareholders breached
their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders, the NoDak
court did not examine the issue of fairness. Rather, the court
deferred to the OCC's determination that the merger met all
necessary procedural requirements and was therefore
permissible. 16 '
The fairness test, however, requires the court to analyze is-
sues relating to both procedural and substantive fairness. 62
Moreover, when the same directors represent the majority
shareholders on both sides of the merger, 63 as in NoDak, the
fairness test compels the directors to "demonstrate their utmost
good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bar-
gain."' 64 The majority shareholders and directors in NoDak
may well have failed to pass this stringent test of fairness.
Another method of evaluating cash-out transactions, the
business purpose test, requires the majority shareholders to
demonstrate some purpose for the merger other than the elimi-
nation of the minority shareholders.' 65 Based on the NoDak
required when examining the rules governing closely-held corporations. Id. at
228.
159. See supra notes 78, 81-82 and accompanying text (describing the fair-
ness test and its following).
160. Supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
161. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418, 1419. Despite the minority shareholders' re-
quest to the OCC to undertake an examination of the fairness of the merger, the
OCC merely reviewed the procedural aspects of the merger and granted ap-
proval. Id. at 1418. NoDak concurred in the OCC's evaluation. Id.
162. Supra note 81.
163. The fairness test developed in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983) (en banc), establishes a much more stringent test for those transac-
tions where directors are acting on both sides of the transaction. See supra note
82 and accompanying text (discussing the fairness test).
164. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,
91 A.2d 57, 57-58 (Del. 1952)).
165. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (describing the business
purpose test).
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court's opinion, it appears that the Liberty merger was designed
exclusively to eliminate the minority shareholders. The only dif-
ference in the successor bank and its predecessor was that Dick-
inson wholly owned the successor bank.166 In fact, Dickinson
established an interim bank solely to accomplish the merger.167
Absent additional facts that would indicate another, valid pur-
pose for the merger, the merger in NoDak would fail the busi-
ness purpose test.
A more controversial method for analyzing cash-out merg-
ers, the equal treatment doctrine, requires equal treatment of
all shareholders holding the same class of stock.168 Because all
Liberty shareholders held the same class of stock, the doc-
trine would prohibit the cash-out of Liberty's minority
shareholders.169
2. The Modern View of Cash-Outs in Closely-Held
Corporations
Because Liberty is a closely-held entity,170 corporate law
grants greater protection to its minority shareholders than to
shareholders of publicly-held corporations. Cash-out transac-
tions of closely-held businesses may have to pass not only the
business purpose test, but also an expanded version of the busi-
ness purpose test that permits the minority shareholders to
demonstrate that any legitimate purpose of the merger could be
achieved without a cash-out. 17 ' Because the only purpose of the
Liberty merger appeared to be the elimination of the minority
shareholders, the merger would fail both the business purpose
test and the expanded business purpose test. The majority
shareholders of closely-held corporations may also be required to
meet a stringent level of fiduciary duty towards the minority
shareholders. 172 Although NoDak did not examine this issue,
Liberty's minority shareholders alleged specific acts of majority
shareholder misconduct that, if true, would demonstrate a
166. NoDak, 998 F.2d at 1418.
167. Id.
168. Supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
169. See Brief for Plaintiff/Appellee NoDak Bancorporation at 2, NoDak
(Nos. 92-2502, 92-2505, 92-2508, 92-2509) (stating that all shareholders of Lib-
erty National Bank held the same class of stock).
170. Id. The NoDak opinion never made reference to the fact that Liberty is
a closely-held entity.
171. Supra note 94 and accompanying text.
172. Supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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breach of that fiduciary duty.173 Such a breach may have been
sufficient under North Dakota law to allow the court to dissolve
the entity due to unfair treatment of the minority
shareholders.' 7 4
3. Lewis and Reliance on the Equal Treatment Doctrine
The Lewis court relied heavily on the equal treatment doc-
trine to support its conclusion that cash-outs in national bank
mergers are impermissible.'7 5 Although the Lewis court
reached the correct holding, the court could easily have relied on
a less controversial and more widely accepted doctrine to reach
the same result. Given that Lewis, like NoDak, analyzed a
merger of a closely-held entity,176 it could have relied on the
fairness test, the business purpose test, the expanded version of
the business purpose test, or relevant state law regarding
closely-held businesses to evaluate the merger.
Unlike the NoDak court, the Lewis court noted that the dis-
tinction between closely-held and publicly-held entities is criti-
cal in determining the rights of the entities's shareholders. 177
Unfortunately, Lewis made note of this distinction only to dis-
card case law involving cash-outs of publicly-held corporations,
and made no effort to review case law involving cash-outs of pri-
vately-held entities.' 78 Had the Lewis court reviewed this case
law, it could have supported its holding with a more accepted
method of cash-out evaluation and may have induced the entire
NoDak court, rather than only the dissent, to follow its lead in
holding that cash-outs in national bank mergers are
impermissible.
173. See supra note 103 (discussing allegations against the majority
shareholders).
174. Under North Dakota law, courts have the power to dissolve closely-held
entities when those in control of the entity act in a manner unfairly prejudicial
to the minority shareholders. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(1)(b)(2) (1993).
In determining whether to dissolve the entity, the courts are to
take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely
held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and reason-
able manner... and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders
as they exist at the inception and develop during the course of the
shareholders' relationship with the corporation and with each other.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(3) (1993).
175. Lewis v. Clark [sic], 911 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
176. Id. at 1560-61.
177. Id. at 1560.
178. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The permissibility of cash-out transactions in national bank
mergers has significant implications not only for the rights of
minority shareholders, but also for the distribution and ultimate
control of banking resources. In an opinion that failed to ac-
knowledge congressional policy regarding the distribution of
banking resources, yielded unnecessarily to a misguided regula-
tory agency interpretation, and relied on outdated corporate law
that severely restricted minority shareholders' rights, the
Eighth Circuit recently concluded that cash-out transactions are
permissible.
Congress has long encouraged the diffusion of banking re-
sources across numerous banks as well as across numerous bank
shareholders. Cash-out mergers frustrate this policy because
they permit banking resources to be concentrated among major-
ity shareholders. This concentration of resources may be mini-
mal when the bank's stock remains widely held even after the
cash-out. Moreover, the impact of the cash-out may be allevi-
ated when the bank's stock is readily available for repurchase on
the open market. Because these mitigating factors do not apply
to closely-held entities, however, cash-out mergers of closely-
held national banks contravene congressional policy and are
impermissible.
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